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Long duration and complex mission scenarios are characteristics of NASA’s human exploration of Mars, and 
will provide unprecedented challenges.  Systems reliability and safety will become increasingly demanding and 
management of uncertainty will be increasingly important. NASA’s current pioneering strategy recognizes and 
relies upon assurance of crew and asset safety. In this regard, flexibility to develop and innovate in the 
emergence of new design environments and methodologies, encompassing modeling of complex systems, is 
essential to meet the challenges.  
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I.  Introduction 
ASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) is supporting and working to develop several key 
strategies and approaches to address the complex assurance challenges of NASA’s upcoming missions. Together 
these will comprise an advanced framework for complex systems assurance, compatible with Model Based 
Systems Engineering (MBSE) approaches. The concept of this framework is illustrated in Figure 1. Adopting an 
objectives-based approach to systems safety 
and reliability is the first step1. This transitions 
from prescriptive assurance processes to 
instead requiring demonstration, through a 
Safety/Assurance Case, that the key 
objectives needed to assure mission success 
are identified and fulfilled. The 
Safety/Assurance Case will provide the 
critical information and integration of mission 
data sources for gauging the acceptance of the 
mission risk. Embodying this approach in 
standards will allow for innovative 
engineering processes and products.  
Contemporaneously, MBSE is increasingly 
used in design and development of complex 
systems. NASA has long recognized the 
importance of modeling and simulation in 
designing and evaluating missions, and 
growing NASA interest in MBSE is evident.  
As NASA develops systems using MBSE, 
NASA OSMA will need to employ 
complementary assurance strategies, tools and 
methods that are more compatible with such 
MBSE practices. These will facilitate better 
integration into the design process, improved insight, and the rapid assessment of alternatives from the assurance 
viewpoint2. Further, direct implementation of models that address uncertainty in a meaningful and comprehensive 
fashion are needed to improve the understanding of risks and to improve design decisions about the systems and 
missions3.  
The sections that follow expand upon these themes: 
Section II: the challenges that stem from the increasing complexities of NASA’s future explorations, and the 
changes these are driving. 
Section III: the emergence of Safety/Assurance Cases as the underpinning of NASA’s transition to an objectives-
based approach to systems safety and reliability. 
Section IV: NASA’s development of Objective Based Standards, to provide assurance the flexibility to 
accommodate emerging approaches to systems engineering (notably MBSE). 
Section V: the beneficial interplay between MBSE and assurance, with illustrations from a NASA/JSC project. 
Section VI: opportunities for further synergy between MBSE and assurance via incorporation of more advanced 
modeling and analysis techniques. 
Section VII: illustration of using the NASA Reliability and Maintainability Objective Hierarchy as the starting 
point for development of an assurance case, further assisted by integration with MBSE models. 
II. Complex Systems: Driving Change  
NASA’s plans for human endeavor to the surface of Mars presents significant challenges. Mission times will 
eventually approach 1100 days and an overall manned Mars campaign may extend for decades. The distances covered 
will create need for greater autonomy due to communications intermittency and delays. The requirements for transport, 
habitat and operations will need to include resiliency, reliability and sustainability, while supporting crew safety and 
health. These demands will ultimately drive increasingly complex systems consisting of software intensive, robotic 
and human operated hardware elements interacting as shown in Figure 2. 
The habitat, as shown in the International Space Station based concept in Figure 3, from4, is an example of a 
complex system needed to fulfill deep space requirements. Its usage in long duration flights far from Earth will 
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Figure 1. A conceptual framework for assurance in a model 
driven environment2. 
 
 
necessitate the crew interacting with many software 
driven subsystems, including communications, 
guidance and navigation, propulsion, and life support.  
One such subsystem, the Environmental Control and 
Life Support System (ECCLS), is a major element of 
the habitat. It provides for clean air and water as well 
as waste management. It is a semi-autonomous system 
that must operate with high reliability to ensure crew 
safety, yet must be repairable and maintainable. The 
water management or Cascade Distillation Systems 
(CDS) portion of the ECCLS is discussed further in 
sections below in the context of addressing system 
complexity in the model based framework and in 
bringing forth evidence for building a Safety or 
Assurance case as discussed in the introduction.  
The importance of the model based framework 
discussed in this paper emerges with increasing 
complexity in designs like the transport habitat. The 
nature of complexity in systems is defined by large 
numbers of interacting components to serve system 
functions, as well as the interfaces across functions. 
Ultimately to manage this complexity, modeling at 
different levels of abstraction becomes essential for design teams to understand design trade-offs, as well as supporting 
safety and reliability analysis.  
Early in the formulation of the architecture of systems, Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) tools and 
strategies are at the front of the design process creating a single set of descriptive models, rather than documents, to 
represent the design. This provides the design teams with a single source of information about the design as it evolves.  
These models form a common basis to understand the system in support of assurance analysis. MBSE has also created 
new opportunities, for the analysis of reliability and safety early in the design, giving rise to frameworks for Model 
Based Safety Analysis5, or in more general terms Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA)2. As discussed in this 
paper this supports the implementation of safety requirements, the execution of reliability analysis and the 
characterization and management of uncertainty, as the design develops.  
Greater uncertainties also emerge with increasing complexity, creating more need for implementation of models 
that directly address uncertainties. There are several sources of such uncertainties emerging from different elements 
of the system.  The accumulation of uncertainties gives rise to increasing unreliability, and therefore it is essential to 
 
Figure 3. Transport module design based on International Space Station derived design concept. The design 
supports a 500-day mission for a crew of 4. The habitat mission depends on the integrity of the structure but 
also on systems such as the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECCLS) which provides for clean 
air and potable water. (Courtesy of David Smitherman, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interactions typical of complex systems of 
future NASA missions. Human, hardware and software 
elements share functionality. 
 
 
characterize and manage uncertainty early in design. Given the perspective of a complete system as introduced Figure 
3, it is obvious that contributing factors arise from human, software and hardware origins. Human performance 
characteristics, source lines of code, electronic part content and materials property variations are examples of sources 
of uncertainty that can be characterized in a modeling framework. As mentioned, models are created as abstractions 
of the emerging design. Models will facilitate design decisions and most represent the system sufficiently for this 
purpose. The extent models may differ from the reality is another type of uncertainty that should be characterized in 
the modeling process; this type of uncertainty is epistemic uncertainty. 
The characterization of uncertainties is managed by the mathematics of probabilities. Whether aleatory or 
epistemic, the mathematics of Bayesian probability theory provides for a “consistent foundation” for advancing 
treatment of uncertainties in modeling and simulation6. The use of SysML based frameworks is providing for 
opportunities for developing this approach by providing for rapid synthesis of logic constructs including fault trees, 
reliability block diagrams and eventually Bayesian Nets, which can provide the basis for Bayesian probability 
modeling in support of reliability analysis, safety assessment and risk analysis. The ability to synthesize these 
constructs in SysML tools and move them to other modeling will offset complexities and provide for more timely and 
accurate analysis of systems in development.  
III. The Safety/Assurance Case 
Safety Cases are used to manage and regulate major hazard industries (e.g., nuclear power, railroads, aviation, and 
offshore oil platforms) in Europe and elsewhere. Their origin traces back to the nuclear industry in the UK in the 
1960s. The following definition of a Safety Case is taken from the UK’s Defence Standard 00-567: 
The Safety Case shall consist of a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, that provides a compelling, 
comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment. 
Observe from this definition that a safety case is an argument, i.e., it is intended for human understanding. The 
argument rests on evidence – both “direct” evidence (e.g., the results of tests, analyses, inspections) coupled with 
“backing” evidence to convey the trustworthiness of the direct evidence (e.g., that inspections were performed by 
trained personnel following accepted practices). The structured nature of the argument refers to its organization, 
necessary for presenting the case for the safety of a large and/or complex system. Overall, the argument must be 
compelling – it must convince people that a system is safe, comprehensible – understandable by people (the structured 
nature of the argument is important in this regard, so that humans can navigate and understand the safety case for a 
large and complex system), and valid – the argument must be consistent and complete, so that the safety claims of the 
system indeed follow from the structure of the argument and the evidence on which it based. The phrase safe for a 
given application in a given operating environment draws attention to the need to establish the context within which 
the safety case establishes that a system is safe. When the safety case concept is applied to properties other than safety, 
it is referred to in more general terms (e.g., “assurance case” or “dependability case”). 
In the aerospace domain, a retrospectively constructed dependability case for NASA Goddard’s User Spacecraft 
Clock Calibration System was reported8. NASA’s Constellation program recommended a dependability case as the 
means to document the properties required of flight software9, contemporaneously with a National Research Council 
study10 recommending them for critical software systems in general. Experience developing assurance cases for 
spacecraft safing were described in11. Particularly for aviation, assurance cases have received growing attention – see  
a recent summary12. For NASA System Safety, the closely related concept of a “Risk Informed Safety Case” (RISC) 
is described in13. 
As reported in13, the now-prominent role of argumentation in safety cases traces back to14. The methodical 
construction of a safety case was a key theme of15, along with use of a graphical notation for presenting a case’s 
argument. The “Goal Structuring Notation” (GSN) has emerged as a widely used such notation, and has been 
standardized by the GSN working group16. Software tools for creating, editing and viewing assurance cases (e.g., 
Adelard’s ASCE™, Astah’s GSN editor, NASA Ames’ AdvoCATE) generally support GSN. The use of these tools 
promotes the potential for linking evidence from the modeling environment to the safety or assurance case. 
In addition to constructing assurance cases, there is the need to evaluate them. A case’s argument may be invalid 
due to fallacies – see17 for a taxonomy of such. More subtly, it may be logically consistent, but provide inadequate or 
even incorrect evidence in support of one or more of the claims at its basis – a tragic example of such is the flawed 
safety case for the Nimrod aircraft, the construction of which is excoriated in18. Approaches to assessing the confidence 
to be had from an assurance case are discussed in19. Key to developing more effective safety cases is address 
uncertainties in the models and simulations that support the evidence in the case which in turn supports the claims that 
are the basis of assurance. 
IV. Objectives Based Standards 
The need for a new and flexible approach to assurance is clear as system engineering shifts gears toward model-
based systems engineering and as the assurance fields began to embrace the safety case approach1. The objectives-
based approach provides for this flexibility and increases the effectiveness of assurance activities by focusing on what 
is specifically important to mission success, rather than codifying a rigid set of processes. NASA announced this 
approach in 2014: https://sma.nasa.gov/news/articles/newsitem/2014/12/04/osma-introduces-new-objectives-based-
strategies. As stated there: 
…The team (of Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) subject matter experts) developed an objectives hierarchy for the 
R&M discipline to systematically decompose technical considerations that form the basis for the discipline. 
The resulting hierarchy is formed by a system of strategies and objectives that build upon each other to support the top 
objective, which states that “system performs as required over the lifecycle to satisfy mission objectives.” The top objective 
is flanked by the program or project’s requirements and contexts, which provide the framework for thinking about the 
objective. 
The R&M Hierarchy has four sub-objectives pertaining to the design conformance, longevity, tolerance to faults and 
failures, and maintainability. The sub-objectives are subsequently deconstructed into increasingly specific objectives and 
related design and assurance strategies, implicitly capturing the rationale for those lower-level strategies. 
The concept utilizes elements of the Goal Structured Notation (GSN). GSN, developed at York University, defines logic-
based structures and symbols to document safety or assurance cases. For the R&M hierarchy, a modified version of GSN 
was used to specify the technical considerations that spaceflight projects are expected to address to support claims about 
the reliability and maintainability of a system. 
Elements at the lowest levels of the hierarchy are sufficiently concrete to allow programs to select relevant R&M 
tools and approaches to establish confidence that the considerations documented in the hierarchy are sufficiently 
addressed. This flexibility will support the emerging use of MBSE and MBMA in NASA. In addition, as shown in 
later sections of this paper, an objectives based strategy supports the development of effective safety and assurance 
cases by providing the starting point for their development. The top level of the Reliability and Maintainability 
objectives hierarchy developed by NASA is shown in Figure 4. 
V. Model Based Practices for Complex System Analysis 
Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE), embracing the Systems Modeling Language (SysML™)20, is rapidly 
emerging in the aerospace industry as the predominant way to practice the synthesis and architecture development for 
 
Figure 4. Top level of the reliability and maintainability objectives hierarchy. 
 
 
complex systems.  MBSE offers significant opportunities across the life cycle of a project to enhance system 
development for complex architectures for both crewed and robotic systems. It provides for a consistent way to 
communicate information about the system requirements and the emerging system architecture to meet the 
requirements. The models, built in the SysML standard framework, become the central basis or “single truth” about 
the design, for the design team to interact with across disciplines.  
Several types of models emerge from the SysML in practice. A requirements hierarchy describes the requirements 
of the system and structural models or functional block diagrams relate the functions of the system. Behavioral models 
such as use case diagrams and activity diagrams show how the system is used.  Parametric models can incorporate 
mathematical relationships and constraints that can be extended in to the probabilistic realm.  
SysML models also provide for significant advantages to the safety and assurance domain, providing opportunities 
for innovation, effectiveness and cost savings21,2.  The basic SysML models provide an excellent approach to 
effectively incorporate safety requirements and analysis into complex systems as the architecture begins to emerge. 
Further the basic models emerging from SysML have been shown to be effective in identifying hazards and in 
formulating failure modes and effects analysis early in the development21,22. As an example, Mhenni et. al15 have 
shown for a pilot commanded electro mechanical actuator, which failure modes predominate, through structural and 
behavioral models. 
Work within NASA 
has shown that basic 
reliability models, 
including Reliability 
Block Diagrams, 
Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) and Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA), can be 
synthesized from the 
SysML representations 
of structural and 
behavioral models in a 
highly-automated 
fashion, early in the 
development. This was 
shown be effective for a 
safety critical system 
for water purification 
essential to manned 
flight in space23 and is 
further discussed 
below.  
By following the 
systems engineering 
(SE) processes and 
relying on the SysML 
as a standard way of 
capturing the multiple 
views required to 
understand the high 
level as well as the 
details of the spacecraft 
design, system design 
knowledge can be 
effectively 
communicated among 
all the stakeholders24. 
As part of the effort to 
develop a method to 
 
Figure 5. SysML to: FMECA (top), FTA (bottom) Extraction Tools. 
 
integrate Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) activities into the SE process, a Fault Management (FM) meta-model 
was developed to describe the relationships between model elements. This meta-model includes the structural and 
behavioral elements of a system using the block definition diagram (BDD), internal block diagrams (IBD), and State 
Machine models. Along with the meta-model, a set of plugins was developed within the selected modeling tool 
(MagicDraw) to extract the information captured within the models and generate the different analysis tools supporting 
the R&M activities. The plugins are able to automatically generate the Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticalities 
Assessment (FMECA) and Fault Tree outputs by traversing the models, as seen in Figure 5.  
The FM modeling approach and tools were used on the Cascade Distillation System (CDS), a NASA/JSC project 
aimed at developing the next generation of Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLSS) support future human 
exploration missions beyond low earth orbit. CDS was a project that chose to use model based systems engineering 
tools and techniques for implementing system design and technical management processes.  The CDS 2.0 system 
model used SysML representation and tools to extract design artifacts including FMECA and FTAs.  By using the 
model based fault management engineering method, the CDS project has taken some early steps in embedding the 
R&M activities from the early phases of the project. This has allowed the system engineer to identify the potential 
critical failures modes by the Preliminary Design Review, and proactively mitigate the risks associated with these 
failure modes25. 
As projects advance, additional R&M products will need to be generated from the SysML models in order to 
support the future Project Lifecycle Phases Reviews. The current focus is aimed at extending the meta-model to 
include information that will allow the generation of additional R&M products such as PRA and RBDs.  An initial 
PRA plug-in has been developed, using the FTA logic to traverse the model to assess probability attributes and 
determine contribution of all components. Extensions such as these will help to analyze and mature the design of 
systems and enable NASA to apply the method and tools to other spaceflight systems. Indeed, similar approaches are 
being pursued in JPL’s application of MBSE to robotic missions, where methodology and tooling has been developed 
for leveraging fault and failure information in the system model to conduct PRA26,27. The next steps are to perform 
more complex analysis that included the application of Bayesian probability theory. 
VI. Incorporating Advanced Models  
 The emergence of MBSE and MBMA creates many opportunities for enabling reliability and safety engineering 
for complex missions.  Advanced models and simulations can be incorporated into the SysML environment, taking 
advantage of a semantically rigorous and complete representation of the architecture on which to perform analysis 
early on in the development. 
As shown in the previous 
discussion this includes 
traversing these system 
models to automatically 
generate fault trees, given the 
appropriate meta-model, 
from which an understanding 
of failure scenarios can be 
derived. Calculation of the 
probability of the top-level 
event follows from 
conventional treatment of 
this type of logic structure 
and is a straightforward 
analysis.  
For more advanced 
analysis, the logic structure 
of the fault tree can be passed 
from the SysML framework 
to a more rigorous analysis 
environment. For example, 
SysML diagrams can be 
translated into executable 
models for use by MatLab 
 
Figure 6. A notional diagram for SysML driven analyses. BNs will take on a 
greater role enabled by SysML constructs and compatible analytical 
environments for simulation. 
 
 
Simulink®28. It follows that the SysML generated fault trees can also be translated in a similar manner.  In the 
simulation environment, the fault tree can be operated on with more complex probability analysis. For example, an 
auto generated fault tree may be passed to MatLab Simulink, and with manipulation by analyst, and complexities in 
the system may be better addressed by dynamic analysis29. Fault trees also provide a logic structure consistent with 
Bayesian probability theory30. 
Complexities in real systems can best be handled with Bayesian Nets (BN) which can extend the ability to 
understand the system reliability, incorporate multiple sources of data and manage both aleatory and epistemic 
uncertainties in a single consistent framework. The utility of Bayesian Nets has been demonstrated with many types 
of systems including human operated systems used for spaceflight communications at GSFC; they are readily 
adaptable to include many system complexities and are promoted for safety analysis by NASA. They are widely used 
to make inferences about Human-In-The-Loop systems to better understand human –system interactions, including 
for automotive operation for assisted driving31. 
The authors contend that meta-models and plug-ins can be extended to develop BNs. As discussed, RBDs and FTs 
are readily extracted from traversing the SysML models given the correct SysML framework and meta–model. These 
logic structures can be converted to BNs32, 33. Given a synthesized BN, it can be passed to a more rigorous analytical 
environment as described previously. Clearly, the integration of SysML with analytical languages (e.g., AltaRica), 
with scripting languages (e.g., Python) and with environments that support both design and analysis (e.g., Simulink®) 
are extending the capabilities of SysML to enhance safety and to perform analysis on highly complex systems. A 
framework reflecting this is proposed in Figure 6. 
VII. Integrated Modeling Frameworks 
The Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) objectives hierarchy described earlier has been applied to create an 
assurance case for the radiation reliability of an experiment board with a science objective to count the number of 
upsets in a 28nm commercial SRAM while on-orbit as part of a university CubeSat experiment. In Figure 7, a 
simplified diagram of the CubeSat experiment board is presented. The input power from the spacecraft is a regulated 
3V rail (blue boxes in Figure 9).  This 3V primary power is divided to the different power domains by load switches 
to create a rail that supplies the parts in green and a rail that supplies the part in orange.  There are three regulators on 
the board to provide the 
three voltage domains for 
the SRAM and are the red 
boxes parts in Figure 7. 
The load switches 
provide current limiting 
to protect against single-
event latch-ups on the 
board.  These load 
switches also prevent 
high current conditions 
from propagating to the 
rest of the satellite.  Load 
Switch A has an auto 
restart capability after a 
high current event and 
Load Switch B toggles a 
flag signal after a high current event.  The load switches result in 5 isolated power domains on the experiment board.  
The microcontroller handles reading and writing to the SRAM, counting the number of upsets, and reporting the 
science data and health of the board on an I2C bus.  The watchdog timer (WDT) is tasked to recover the microcontroller 
from single-event functional interrupts.   
The assurance case for the radiation reliability of the experiment board was created using the Goal Structuring 
Notation (GSN) and SysML models implemented in WebGME, a web-based modeling tool that allows for the creation 
of domain-specific modeling languages34. SysML models supported in this platform include architectural models that 
are built from library of component/sub-system block diagram models. Internal block diagram models capture the 
faults and their propagation. Additionally, functional requirement models capture the high-level functional 
requirements and their decomposition into more specific and concrete functions.  
 
Figure 7. Simplified Block Diagram of CubeSat Experiment Board modified from35. 
The GSN model for the board is a graphical 
assurance case that decision makers will access to 
accept risk. It also documents how risk has been 
mitigated. This case is part of what is presented in 
reviews from early on to the Critical Design Review. 
The overall goal, or claim, of this assurance case is 
that “Systems remains functional for intended 
radiation environment in order to complete the 
science mission requirement.” In order to complete 
this goal, understanding the radiation mechanisms 
and environment is required which is the overall 
strategy. Through understanding the radiation 
mechanisms, 2 sub-goals for the system emerge - 
one, that the individual parts of the system can 
withstand the radiation stresses for the life of the 
missions, and two, that the system is tolerant to 
radiation faults and failure. This top-level case is 
presented in Figure 8.  
Goal 2 is further argued in Figure 9 which 
presents a section of the part-level radiation tolerance 
assurance case. One way to show that the parts are 
tolerant to radiation is to perform radiation tests and 
present the results which is seen in Strategy 3, Goal 
5, Goal 9 and Solution 2. If the part cannot be shown 
to be radiation tolerant, then a system-level 
mitigation scheme is implemented as seen in 
Strategy 5 and Goal 7. 
Figure 10 makes the argument for the system-
level mitigation scheme of single-event effects. This includes detection (Goal 8), isolation (Goal 6), and recovery 
(Goal 10). The solution nodes can contain references to artifacts that serve as evidence such as test reports.   
Figure 11 shows a functional decomposition model of the system. The lowest level functions are linked to 
components (references from architectural model) that provide the functionality. The GSN assurance case model can 
be linked to elements in other SysML models.  The goals and strategy nodes in the GSN model can contain references 
(or links) to specific nodes in the functional model, architectural models and fault models. This allows for GSN models 
to interact with other models in an MBSE paradigm. Linking nodes in the GSN models to elements in other models 
helps establish the system-level context 
for the specific portions of the assurance 
argument.  This context could be useful to 
track the functions, faults, components, 
and subsystems that are covered as part of 
the assurance and reliability argument and 
identify any gaps or inconsistencies 
particularly when system models evolve.  
By organizing the assurance case into 
goals and child-goals, the logic of the 
argument for radiation reliability is made 
explicit in the graphical model. In 
addition, the model allows for the mission 
assurance objectives to fit into the larger 
MBSE paradigm for system design which 
provides the ability to manage greater 
complexity.  Assumptions that are hidden 
within text arguments surface through the 
assumption nodes leading to rapid upfront 
consideration of reliability and safety. 
These arguments are eventually evaluated 
 
Figure 9. Section of part-level radiation tolerance assurance case. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Top-level Radiation Assurance Case 
through system tests summarized in solution nodes.  
The end result of the GSN argument construction is 
an easy-to-follow graphical representation of 
factors affecting the radiation reliability of the 
CubeSat experiment that makes mitigation 
decisions and remaining risks transparent to a 
reliability review team which should improve the 
productivity of reliability reviews.  
VIII. Conclusion 
The forward looking pivot to Objectives based 
approaches from OSMA and the emergence of 
MBSE and other model-based thinking has 
provided significant opportunities for the 
Assurance community.  The ability to directly and 
quickly access “authoritative sources of truth”, the 
context in which they are found and the ability to 
use machines to mine, identify and correlate nearly 
any piece of information has the potential to 
revolutionize the way the various assurance 
disciplines are performed.  While the integrated 
Model-Based Mission Assurance approach is still 
nascent, the various elements required to develop 
and implement this approach are moving forward 
rapidly.   
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